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Abstract
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by
considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model of
interdependent values (IDV). It is well-known that in multi-item settings with private values,
correlated values can lead to bad PoA, which can be polynomially large in the number of
agents n. In the more general model of IDV, we show that the PoA can be polynomially large
even in single-item settings. On the positive side, we identify a natural condition on information
dispersion in the market, termed γ-heterogeneity, which enables good PoA guarantees. Under
this condition, we show that for single-item settings, the PoA of standard mechanisms degrades
gracefully with γ. For settings with m > 1 items we show a separation between two domains:
If n ≥ m, we devise a new simultaneous item auction with good PoA (with respect to γ), under
limited information asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first positive PoA
result for correlated values in multi-item settings. The main technical difficulty in establishing
this result is that the standard tool for establishing PoA results — the smoothness framework —
is unsuitable for IDV settings, and so we must introduce new techniques to address the unique
challenges imposed by such settings. In the domain of n m, we establish impossibility results
even for surprisingly simple scenarios.
1 Introduction
We study simple and practical mechanisms for selling heterogeneous items to unit-demand agents,1
with the goal of maximizing social welfare. While much of the literature focuses on truthful mech-
anisms (for which it is in the agents’ best interest to report their true values for the items), such
mechanisms are often complicated, computationally and cognitively demanding, and must be run
in a centralized manner [Dobzinski, 2011, Li, 2017a, Ausubel et al., 2006]. In many real-life settings
like e-commerce, the mechanisms used in practice are simple and run in a distributed manner, but
are non-truthful. A prime example is the auctions run by e-Bay, where each item is sold separately
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in a second-price auction, so that an agent interested in winning at most one auction may be better
off reporting lower than her true values, to avoid multiple wins.
Motivated by such settings, Christodoulou et al. [2016a] pioneered the study of simultaneous
item auctions, where a single-item auction is run for each item separately. Since such auctions are
non-truthful, their performance is measured by their Bayesian Price of Anarchy (B-PoA) — the
ratio between the optimal welfare and the welfare guarantee of the worst equilibrium. Christodoulou
et al. and many follow-ups show that this simple format achieves near-optimal welfare in combina-
torial settings when the auction in use is the first- or second-price auction (see Roughgarden et al.
[2017] for an overview of results). Importantly, all prior works assume independence of different
buyers’ valuations, since otherwise the PoA might be polynomial in the number of agents [Bhawalkar
and Roughgarden, 2011, Feldman et al., 2013, Roughgarden, 2014].
There are many settings in which the independence assumption is unrealistic. For instance,
if an item being auctioned has the potential of being resold in the future, this potential factors
into agents’ values for the item, creating dependence on how others value it. Such dependence is
formally captured by the interdependent values (IDV) model [Milgrom and Weber, 1982], which
recently received a surge of interest following the recent awarding of the Nobel prize in economics to
Milgrom and Wilson for their work on auction theory. In this model, the correlation of values stems
directly from one of the most fundamental aspects of a market — the way in which information is
dispersed among agents. In more detail, each agent has a privately-known signal, which captures
her partial knowledge about the items for sale. Her value for each item is a function of all the
information on the market related to this item; that is, of her own signal as well as the signals of
all other agents (which are unknown to her). Since the valuations of different agents depend on the
same signals, values are correlated.
IDV settings have been studied extensively in the economic literature since Milgrom and Weber
[1982], and in the computer science literature [Ito and Parkes, 2006, Constantin et al., 2007, Robu
et al., 2013, Chawla et al., 2014, Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016, Eden et al., 2019]; see Kr-
ishna [2009] for an overview and Section 1.3 for additional related work. Realistic scenarios captured
by this model include common value auctions [Klemperer, 1998], mineral rights auctions [Wilson,
1969] and resale [Myerson, 1981, Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016]. We use the latter as a
running example throughout the paper:
Example 1.1 (Resale model). Let si be the private signal of agent i ∈ [n], distributed uniformly
between 0 and 1. This signal captures the appreciation of agent i for the item for sale. Agent i’s
valuation function is vi(s) = si + β
∑
j 6=i sj for some parameter β ∈ (0, 1). That is, the agent also
takes into account the others’ assessment of the item (possibly since she plans to resell the item
eventually).
Our main question is:
Main Question. What is the B-PoA of simultaneous item auctions with IDV?
The bounds we establish partially answer an open question of Roughgarden et al. [2017] regard-
ing natural, economically-meaningful forms of correlation for which the B-PoA of simultaneous
item auctions is bounded.
1.1 Challenges
Several challenges arise when approaching the task of bounding the B-PoA in IDV. As intuition
suggests, the domain of problems that can be modeled by interdependent values is very large, and
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includes the mostly-studied setting of private values, correlated or uncorrelated. Due to the wide
scope, it is unsurprising that in full generality there is no hope to achieve a good bound for the
B-PoA. Our lower bounds formalize the need for assumptions in order to get a bound independent
of the number of agents.
A standard assumption in the interdependent model is single-crossing (SC). Intuitively it means
that the information possessed by an agent has more influence on her own value than on others’
values. SC enables many positive results in settings with interdependence [Ausubel et al., 2000,
Maskin, 1996, Chawla et al., 2014]. For example, in a single item setting, the truthful (generalized)
Vickrey auction achieves optimal welfare only with SC. However, SC alone is insufficient for ensuring
good B-PoA results of simple auctions, even with a single item. The following proposition shows
that any mechanism that allocates the item to the agent with the highest value is prone to a large
degree of social inefficiency even with SC.
Proposition 1.2. There exists a single-item, n-bidder setting satisfying SC such that the PoA of
every auction that allocates the item to the highest-valued bidder is Ω(n).2
While the full proof is deferred to the Appendix A.2, the intuition behind this negative result
is instructive for identifying necessary assumptions for positive results: Consider n bidders whose
signals belong to subsets S1 = {1}, S2 = {1}, and Si = [0, 1] for i ≥ 3, respectively. Consider
the valuation profile v1 =
∑
i∈[n] si + ε, v2 = 2(s2 + ε), and vi = si for i ≥ 3, where ε > 0 is
arbitrarily small. In this setting, the signals of bidders i ≥ 3 have a significant effect on bidder 1’s
value but have no effect on bidder 2’s value. In a scenario where these bidders have high signals,
bidder 1’s value is significantly higher than bidder 2’s value. However, bidders i ≥ 3 never win the
item, since bidder 1 out-values them for every signal profile. Thus, they may as well report low
signals in equilibrium, resulting in an outcome where bidder 2 wins the item. A similar result to
Proposition 1.2 holds for every deterministic truthful (ex-post incentive compatible) mechanism.
Incentive compatibility. In the context of interdependence, incentive compatibility (IC) and
individual rationality (IR) are defined ex-post, i.e., it is in every bidder’s best interest to participate
and report her true signal given that all other bids are also truthful (bidding truthfully is an ex-post
equilibrium of the mechanism – see Section 2.3).
Definition 1.3 (Ex-post IC-IR). A single-item mechanism is ex-post IC-IR if for every signal
profile s, bidder i and bid bi,
xi(s)vi(s)− pi(s) ≥ max{xi(bi, s−i)vi(s)− pi(bi, s−i), 0}.
Ex-post IC-IR mechanisms can be characterized as mechanisms with a monotone allocation
rule [e.g. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2016]: for every bidder i and partial bid profile b−i,
the allocation rule xi(bi,b−i) is (weakly) increasing in bi. The monotone allocation rule is coupled
with a payment rule uniquely determined by the allocation rule. For deterministic mechanisms the
winner i is charged by his critical bid. For this class of mechanisms we show the following (see
Appendix A.2).
Proposition 1.4. There exists a single-item, n-bidder setting, satisfying single-crossing, such that
the PoA of every deterministic ex-post IC-IR mechanism is Ω(
√
n) (even under no-overbidding).
2This holds even under the standard no-overbidding assumption (see Section 2) and under additional conditions
such as submodularity over signals [Eden et al., 2019].
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1.2 Our Results
We study simple mechanisms in which the agents report their signals to the auction(s). All our
positive results hold with respect to Bayesian equilibrium, which is the strongest guarantee, and
thus propagate to other equilibrium notions (see Observation 2.8). Moreover, we show that pure
equilibria need not exist even in a single-item setting (see Proposition A.1), which further motivates
our choice of benchmark.3 Since we are tackling new uncharted territory, our starting point is a
single item, where we already face new challenges that do not exist in private values settings.
Single Item. We consider natural auction formats like first-price and second-price. As discussed
above, the PoA of such auctions inherently depends on the number of agents. In the proofs of
Propositions 1.2 and 1.4, a single bidder is highly influenced by the signals of others, while all other
bidders have private values. Thus, the effect of bidder signals on different bidders may vary greatly.
We parameterize the extent of this variation by γ (Definition 3.2) and establish positive results
that depend on γ.
Our main positive result for a single item applies to generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) —
a natural generalization of the Vickrey auction to interdependent values [Maskin, 1996, Ausubel
et al., 2000]. We show that the B-PoA of GVA under SC is γ (see Theorem 3.3), and this is
tight (see Theorem 3.4). When considering a relaxed notion of SC called c-SC, we get a bound of
max{γ, c} + 1 for both GVA and second-price auctions (Theorems 3.3 and C.3), which is almost
tight (see Theorems 3.4 and C.4). A non-trivial implication of this result is that in every IDV
setting where γ = c = 1 it holds that every equilibrium is fully efficient. For example, this is the
case in our running example of the resale model (Example 1.1).
Multiple Items. We consider a combinatorial setting with heterogeneous items and unit-demand
valuations. We allow for signals to be multi-dimensional, a notoriously hard setting in the IDV
literature [Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000, Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001]. Our results for this case are
more nuanced. First of all, we show that in general, one cannot approximate the optimal welfare for
a very natural class of mechanisms which includes the ones we reason about in this paper. In the
example showing this, the value of all bidders originates from a single bidder’s signal; that is, this
setting suffers from extreme information asymmetry. Therefore, we provide results for settings with
limited-information asymmetry, like our running example (for a formal definition of the condition,
see Section 4.2).
We then show a separation between two domains: the case where there are more bidders than
items (n ≥ m), and the case where there are many more items than bidders. For the case n ≥ m, we
consider a mechanism that runs a second-price auction for each item considering every bidder’s value
to be her valuation valuated at her bid, zeroing out other bidders’ bids. We refer to this mechanism
as the simultaneous privatized second-price auction. One subtlety that arises in our setting is the
need to enable agents to explicitly express willingness to participate in auctions for individual items.
Our main positive result for multiple items is that for γ-heterogeneous unit-demand bidders, and
under sufficiently limited information asymmetry, the B-PoA of simultaneous privatized second-
price auctions is O(γ2) (under c-SC, we get a bound of O(max{γ, c}2) — see Theorem 4.7 for
details).
3In contrast, for simultaneous auctions with private values, it is known that a PNE exists even for general classes
of valuations (e.g. Christodoulou et al. [2016a]).
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Our proof diverges from the smoothness framework, as the typical proof requires reasoning about
a deviation of bidders who know their value for an item, which is not the case with interdependence.
Our proof decomposes the welfare into two terms and bounds the performance of our auction for
each one separately (for more details, see Section 4).
For the case m n, we provide a strong negative result. We consider the simplest setting one
can imagine: there are n2 items, and bidders have a common value for each item, which is based on
the sum of signals of all bidders for the item (vi`(s) = 1 +
∑
j sj` for every item `). All signals (for
any bidder/item pair) are sampled i.i.d. This example demonstrates the difficulty of coordination
in our setting: For every item, the bidders’ values are equal, and thus the difficulty is in identifying
the valuable items, despite the fact that the information is distributed among bidders. A priori, all
items seem the same, but the signals’ distribution is set up in a way that gives rise to a ball-and-
bins-type phenomenon — the expected value of each item is a constant, but the maximal value
of n items is Θ(lnn/ ln lnn). It follows that Opt = Θ(n lnn/ ln lnn). On the other hand, by the
standard no-overbidding assumption (which is crucial for our positive results in the n ≤ m regime),
the number of items a bidder bids on must be bounded, which in turn upper-bounds the expected
welfare of the bidder. As a result, we show that for the settings discussed, for every simultaneous
item auction and every equilibrium σ, Opt/Eq(σ) = Ω̃(log n) (see Section 5 for the full details).4
Note that this implies that the Price of Stability is Ω̃(log n), which is a stronger negative result
than previously known.
1.3 Related Work
Smoothness Framework. Many of the papers analyzing PoA of auctions make use of the cele-
brated smoothness framework [Roughgarden, 2015a], and its adaptation to auctions and games of
incomplete information [Roughgarden, 2015b, Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013]. More on this can be
found in the survey of Roughgarden et al. [2017].
Simultaneous Auctions. Following Chawla et al. [2014], simultaneous auctions were stud-
ied by many follow-ups, where the auction ran simultaneously is either the second-price (Vick-
rey) [Bhawalkar and Roughgarden, 2011, Fu et al., 2012, Roughgarden, 2015b], or the first-price
auction [Hassidim et al., 2011, Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013, Christodoulou et al., 2016b, Feige et al.,
2015]. These efforts culminated in showing that simultaneous second-price (under a no-overbidding
condition) and first-price auctions achieve PoA of 4 and 2, respectively, for subadditive valuations,
the most general class of complement-free valuations [Feldman et al., 2013]. These results require
values to be uncorrelated.
Simple Auctions with Correlated Values. Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] show that for first-
price auction of a single item, the price of anarchy is 1−1/e, even for correlated value distributions,
and this is tight [Syrgkanis, 2014]. When the values are uncorrelated, Hoy et al. [2018] show that
this bound can be improved. The work of Lucier and Leme [2011] applies to a single item with
correlated values sold through a second-price auction (and more generally, to multiple units sold
through the GSP auction5). Under a no-overbidding assumption, every BNE of the auction achieves
4Ω̃ hides o(logn) terms.
5An auction format used in practice to allocate sponsored-search ad slots. GSP stands for Generalized Second
Price, not to be confused with the (quite different) generalized Vickrey auctions we study in this paper!
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at least 1/4 of the maximum expected welfare. This no-overbidding assumption or variants thereof
are required for all known positive PoA results related to second-price auctions [see Roughgarden
et al., 2017, Section 8.1]. The result of Lucier and Leme [2011] is by a strengthened variant of
smoothness called semi-smoothness or smoothness with private deviations. The semi-smoothness
framework was further developed by Caragiannis et al. [2015] where the bound of 1/4 was improved
to 1/2.927.
Other Objectives and Auction Formats. Hartline et al. [2014] and Azar et al. [2017] consider
the simultaneous item auctions in the context of maximizing revenue and liquid welfare (a welfare
notion suitable for budgeted settings) respectively. Consider now multi-unit (homogeneous item)
settings and downward-sloping valuations. The uniform price auction gives the m available units
to the bidders with the m highest marginals, charging the (m+ 1)st highest marginal. Even with
correlation, every BNE of this auction that satisfies a no-overbidding condition guarantees 1/4 of
the optimal expected welfare [de Keijzer et al., 2013, Babaioff et al., 2014]. Devanur et al. [2015]
consider a different simple bidding format, where the bidders only submits one real number as their
bid. They analyze a mechanism they name ‘Single-Bid’, and show this mechanism gives O(logm)
approximation for sub-additive valuations, which is essentially tight for the class of mechanisms
they consider [Braverman et al., 2016]. Feldman et al. [2016] analyze this mechanism in settings
with restricted complements.
Interdependent Values in AMD Interdependent values model has recently gained attention
in the algorithmic mechanism design community. This interest was initiated by Roughgarden and
Talgam-Cohen [2016] and Li [2017b] which successfully apply the simple vs. optimal paradigm to
the interdependent setting. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2016] show that a prior independent,
single sample mechanism can approximate the optimal revenue under sufficient conditions, and very
similar conditions are used by Li [2017b] to show that running VCG with monopoly reserves can
approximate the optimal welfare as well. Chawla et al. [2014] focused on removing assumptions.
They showed a mechanism that approximates the optimal revenue for Matroid environments that
does not make any distributional assumptions. The assumptions they make on the valuation
functions are single-crossing, and the submodular condition we use for our positive result in the
multi-item setting. Eden et al. [2018] inspected what happens if we remove the single-crossing
assumption in the context of welfare maximization. Without any assumptions on the valuations,
they notice things can turn out arbitrarily bad. Therefore, they inspected the c-SC condition we
inspect in our paper, and showed improved approximation bounds that depend on the parameter
c, and sometimes depend on n as well. Eden et al. [2019] do not make any single-crossing-type
assumption, and focus instead on a submodularity assumption over signals (which they call SoS).
They notice that this condition alone suffices to give constant factor approximation for welfare and
revenue in single-parameter domains, and also in general combinatorial settings when the affect of
one’s signal on her value is independent from the affect of other bidders’ signals on one’s value.
The latter result holds even if signals are multidimensional.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Let x,y be vectors, i an index and A a subset of indices. Then xA is the vector
obtained by taking indices A of x. Let x−A = xA (in particular x−i is vector x with the ith entry
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removed). By x ≤ y we mean xi ≤ yi for all i. Vectors 1 and 0 are the all-ones and all-zeros
vectors.
2.1 Basic Problem Setting
The following is a standard interdependence setting for selling a single item [Milgrom and Weber,
1982]: There are n bidders (agents), each bidder i with a privately-known signal si from signal
space Si (a continuous interval in R≥0). Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S ⊆ S1 × · · · × Sn denote the signal
profile of all bidders. Every bidder i also has a publicly-known valuation vi : S → R≥0, which
is a function of the signal profile s. This dependence of the values on other bidders’ signals is
the defining property of interdependence. Function vi is weakly increasing in each coordinate and
strictly increasing in si. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) denote the valuation profile of all bidders.
We also consider combinatorial settings in which there are m items for sale: For multiple items,
si is multi-dimensional and there is a signal si` for every item `. Value vi` of the `th item is a
function of s` = (s1`, . . . , sn`). We focus on unit-demand valuations, for which the value for a
subset of items T ⊆ [m] is vi(T ; s) = max`∈T {vi`(s`)}.
As part of the classic interdependence model, valuation profiles are assumed to be single-crossing
(SC) [e.g. Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Maskin, 1996, Ausubel et al., 2000].
Definition 2.1 (SC). Valuation profile v is SC if for every bidder pair i, i′, every signal profile s
and every δ ≥ 0,
vi(si + δ, s−i)− vi(s) ≥ vi′(si + δ, s−i)− vi′(s).
Intuitively SC means that a bidder’s own value is influenced the most from a change in her
signal. Eden et al. [2018] introduced a natural relaxation called c-SC for c ≥ 1, which requires
c (vi(si + δ, s−i)− vi(s)) ≥ vi′(si + δ, s−i)− vi′(s). Our results generalize to this relaxation.
Who Knows What. We address both full-information and Bayesian settings. In either model the
signal spaces S1, . . . , Sn and the valuation functions v1, . . . , vn are assumed to be public knowledge.
In full information settings, all bidders know all signals (but the mechanism does not). In Bayesian
settings (our main focus), bidder i has private knowledge of si, which is drawn from a publicly-
known distribution Fi with density fi. We denote by F the publicly-known joint distribution of
signal profile s.
Correlation. Even if the signals are sampled independently, the values are correlated since
they depend on the same signals. This generalizes various types of correlation found in other
papers [Bateni et al., 2015, Chawla et al., 2015, Immorlica et al., 2020]. When dealing with a single
item we further allow the signals themselves to be correlated, i.e., F is not necessarily a product
distribution. We denote by F|si the distribution of s−i given signal si.
Submodularity. Submodularity of the valuation functions is assumed in Section 4; it means
that as a bidder’s own signal increases, an increase in the others’ signals has diminishing marginal
influence on her value:6
6Eden et al. [2019] define a stronger version of valuation submodularity called submodularity over signals (SoS).
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Definition 2.2 (Chawla et al. [2014]). A valuation vi is submodular if for every signal si, every
two profiles of the other bidders s−i ≤ s′−i and every δ ≥ 0,
vi(si + δ, s−i)− vi(si, s−i) ≥ vi(si + δ, s′−i)− vi(si, s′−i).
For multiple items, the same definition applies to vi` (rather than vi) with si, s−i replaced by
si`, (s`)−i.
2.2 Mechanisms
Objective. Our goal is to maximize welfare, that is, for a single item to allocate it to the bidder
with the highest value vi(s), and for multiple items and unit-demand bidders to find a matching of
items to bidders with the maximum total value. We denote the optimal welfare for a given setting
with signal profile s by Opt(s), and the expected optimal welfare by Opt = Es∼F [Opt(s)].
Simple Mechanisms. A mechanism consists of a pair (x, p) of (deterministic) allocation rule x
and payment rule p. The mechanism solicits a signal report (bid) bi from each bidder i. Let
b = (b1, . . . , bn) denote the bid profile. The mechanism outputs for every bidder i an indicator
xi(b) ∈ {0, 1} of whether she wins the item, and her payment pi(b). The allocation rule x guarantees
feasibility, i.e.,
∑
i xi(b) ≤ 1 for every b. Bidder i’s expected utility given bid profile b and true
signal profile s is ui(b, s) = xi(b)vi(s)− pi(b).
No-overbidding (NOB). As standard in the literature on PoA [e.g. Bhawalkar and Roughgar-
den, 2011] we often assume NOB, defined as follows:
Definition 2.3 (Single-item NOB for interdependence). Bid profile b satisfies NOB if bi ≤ si for
every bidder i. Strategy profile σ satisfies NOB if for all b ∼ σ(s), b satisfies NOB.
NOB assumptions reflect bidders’ reluctance to expose themselves to negative utility from over-
bidding and help explain the prevalence of certain auction formats like the second-price auction in
practice. It is well-known that without NOB the second-price auction has unbounded PoA.7
Standard Mechanisms. In mechanisms for IDV, the highest-valued bidder is computed accord-
ing to solicited bids b and the public-knowledge valuation profile v.
Definition 2.4 (Critical bid). Given a partial bid profile b−i, bidder i’s critical bid b
∗
i is the lowest
report for which she wins the item, i.e., b∗i = min{bi | xi(b) = 1}.
Definition 2.5. The generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) solicits signal bids, allocates the item to
the highest-valued bidder i, and charges her critical bid value vi(b
∗
i ,b−i).
There are also natural generalization of the first- and second-price auctions to interdependence
(throughout we refer to these and not the independent private values versions).
7Consider two bidders with (independent private) values ε, 1 where ε  1. Bidding 1, 0 is an equilibrium of the
second-price auction and its welfare is ε, but the optimal welfare is 1. In this equilibrium, the first bidder is bidding
much higher than her value.
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Definition 2.6 (Second-price (2PA) with interdependence). The second-price auction solicits sig-
nal bids, allocates the item to the highest-valued bidder, and charges the second-highest value as
payment.
Definition 2.7 (First-price with interdependence). The first-price auction solicits signal bids,
allocates the item to the highest-valued bidder, and charges her value as payment.
2.3 Price of Anarchy Background
Let σi(·) be bidder i’s bidding strategy as a function of her true signal. A bidding strategy can
be pure (mapping to a single reported signal) or mixed (mapping to a distribution over reported
signals).
Fix a mechanism. Given a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), let σ(s) be a mapping of signals s
to bids, and σ−i(s−i) be the mapping excluding agent i’s bid. We focus on the following equilibrium
concepts:
1. Ex-post equilibrium (EPE): A bidding strategy profile σ constitutes an EPE if σ is deter-
ministic,8 and for every bidder i with signal si, and every signal profile s−i, ui(σ(s); s) ≥
ui((bi, σ(s−i)); s) for every bi.
2. Pure Nash equilibrium (PNE): A bidding strategy profile σ constitutes a PNE of a full infor-
mation setting with signal profile s if σ is deterministic, and for every bidder i, ui(σ(s); s) ≥
ui((bi, σ(s−i)); s) for every bi.
3. Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE): A (possibly randomized) bidding strategy profile σ consti-
tutes a BNE of a Bayesian setting with signal distribution F if for every bidder i and signal
si, and every bi,
Es−i∼F|si [ui(σ(s); s)] ≥ Es−i∼F|si [ui((bi, σ(s−i)); s)] .
Comparisons. Note that the difference between PNE and EPE is that in a PNE, the bidder
takes into account other bidders’ signals, wheres, in an EPE, the bidder is not aware of other
bidders’ signals, and only knows they bid according to their bidding strategy. Moreover, although
both BNE and EPE do not require the bidder to know other bidders’ signals, EPE is a stronger
notion since it requires the bidder to be best responding with respect to every realization of other
bidders’ signals, whereas BNE only requires the bidder to be best responding in expectation over
other bidders’ signals.
The following observation summarizes the relation between the concepts.
Observation 2.8 (Equilibrium hierarchy). Fix a mechanism and a signal profile s. Every EPE is
also a PNE w.r.t. s, and every PNE is a BNE for an appropriate Bayesian setting.
The proof of the above observation is deferred to Appendix B.1.
8Ex-post equilibria are not necessarily deterministic, but as we use these equilibria in the context of lower bounds,
the restriction to deterministic only strengthens our results.
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Price of Anarchy (PoA). The expected welfare achieved by a single-item mechanism (x, p)
for signal profile s and bid profile b is
∑
i xi(b)vi(s). Where the mechanism (in particular, the
allocation rule) is evident from the context, we denote this by SW(b, s). For a equilibrium strategy
σ, let Eq(σ, s) = E[SW(σ(s), s)] be the expected welfare of σ at s, and Eq(σ) = Es∼F [Eq(σ, s)].

















In the above, the supremum is taken over all Bayesian settings. It is also possible to restrict
the class of settings, for example, to those with valuation profiles that satisfy the SC property, or
bidding strategies that satisfy a NOB property. Such restriction will, in general, improve the PoA,
and we leverage this method to achieve our results.
Observation 2.8 implies that lower bounds for EP-PoA and upper bounds for B-PoA propagate
to the other notions.
3 Single Item: A Positive Result
In this section, we focus on single-item settings. Our main result is a (parameterized) property
which, along with SC, leads to good PoA bounds.
Recall the setting described above, where the signal of, say, agent 3 affects only the value of
herself and agent 1, and no other agent. In the opposite extreme, a change in an agent’s signal
affects the values of all other agents equally. That is:
∀i, j, j′ : vj(si + δ, s−i)− vj(s) = vj′(si + δ, s−i)− vj′(s).
We call this condition homogeneous influence. One can verify that homogeneous influence holds
in our running example – the resale model, as well as in other prominent settings like Klemperer’s
wallet-game [Klemperer, 1998], common-values [Wilson, 1969], private values, and private/common
value interpolation [Bergemann and Morris, 2013]. We find that homogeneous influence, together
with SC, ensures full efficiency (this is a direct corollary of Corollary C.1).
Proposition 3.1. In single item settings with SC and homogeneous influence, every equilibrium
of the GVA is fully efficient.
The following question arises: how robust is this result? In other words, how would the PoA
deteriorates as we move away from homogeneous influence? To this end, we introduce the following
parameterized property, which measures how far a valuation profile is from homogeneous influence.
Definition 3.2 (γ-heterogeneity in signal-value impact). A valuation profile is γ-heterogeneous in
signal-value impact, or in short γ-heterogeneous, if for every agent i, two other agents j, j′, signal
profile s and δ > 0,
γ(vj(si + δ, s−i)− vj(s)) ≥ vj′(si + δ, s−i)− vj′(s).
By definition, γ is always at least 1; the special case of γ = 1 is homogeneous influence. Our
main result in this section is a tight bound for the B-PoA for γ-heterogeneous, SC valuations. Our
result extends beyond SC, to c-SC profiles [Eden et al., 2019], where the PoA degrades gracefully
with the parameter c (SC is c-SC for c = 1).
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Theorem 3.3 (Main positive result for single-item). Consider a single-item setting with γ-heterogeneous,
c-SC, continuous valuations. The B-PoA of GVA under NOB is bounded by 1 + max{γ, c}. For
SC valuations the B-PoA is tightly γ. These results hold even for correlated signals.
Theorem 3.3 is essentially tight, as illustrated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4. There exist single-item settings satisfying γ-heterogeneity and c-SC such that the
NE-PoA of the generalized Vickrey auction is arbitrarily close to max{c, γ}, even under no-
overbidding.9
The proof of this lower bound is deferred to the end of this section. We remark that the upper
bound of 1 + max{γ, c} and the lower bound apply also with respect to 2PA with interdependence,
see Appendix C.2 for more details.
Before proving Therom 3.3, we introduce following technical lemma and corollary which will be
useful throughout the paper.
Lemma 3.5. Let v be a valuation profile satisfying γ-heterogeneity and c-SC. Then for every two
agents i, j, signal profile s and coordinate-wise non-negative vector δ = (δ1, . . . , δi−1, 0, δi+1, . . . , δn),
vj(s + δ)− vj(s) ≥
(
vi(s + δ)− vi(s)
)
/max{γ, c}.
Proof. Assume by renaming that i = 1 and j = n; therefore, δ1 = 0. Let s
` = (s1 + δ1, s2 +
δ2, . . . , s` + δ`, s`+1, . . . , sn); that is, the vector s after increasing the first ` coordinates by their
respective δ’s. Note that s1 = s. We have that



































= (v1(s + δ)− v1(s))/max{γ, c}
= (vi(s + δ)− vi(s))/max{γ, c},
where the first inequality follows the c-SC and γ-heterogeneous assumptions.
The following is a direct corollary of Lemma 3.5.
Corollary 3.6. Let v be a valuation profile satisfying γ-heterogeneity and c-SC. For every two
agents i, j, signal profile s and coordinate-wise non-negative vector δ = (δ1, . . . , δi−1, 0, δi+1, . . . , δn),
if vj(s) ≥ vi(s)/d for d ≥ max{γ, c}, then vj(s + δ) ≥ vi(s + δ)/d.
9The theorem holds even under the additional assumption of Submodularity over Signals, for more information
refer to Eden et al. [2019]
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Proof. By Lemma 3.5, vj(s + δ) − vj(s) ≥ (vi(s + δ)− vi(s)) /max{γ, c} ≥ (vi(s + δ)− vi(s)) /d.
Combining this with the fact that vj(s) ≥ vi(s)/d establishes the Lemma.
We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let s be a signal profile and b be a bid profile such that b ≤ s. Let
i ∈ argmaxj vj(s), and w(b) be the winner under b. We prove that
ui((si,b−i); s) ≥ vi(s)−max{γ, c}vw(b)(s). (1)
We distinguish between the following two cases:
Case 1: Bidder i does not win the item under bidding profile (si,b−i). Thus, her utility is 0.
Moreover, there exists a bidder j 6= i such that vj(si,b−i) ≥ vi(si,b−i). Since bidder w(b) wins at
b, vw(b)(b) ≥ vj(b). By Lemma 3.6 (using d = max{γ, c}),
max{γ, c}vw(b)(si,b−i) ≥ vj(si,b−i) ≥ vi(si,b−i).
Applying Lemma 3.6 again, we get
max{γ, c}vw(b)(s) ≥ vi(s).
Therefore,
ui((si,b−i); s) = 0 ≥ vi(s)−max{γ, c}vw(b)(s).
Case 2: Bidder i wins the item under bidding profile (si,b−i). Let b
∗
i ≤ si be i’s critical bid
given b−i. ui((si,b−i); s) = vi(s)− vi(b∗i ,b−i). If w(b) = i,
ui((si,b−i); s) ≥ 0 ≥ vi(s)−max{γ, c}vw(b)(s).
Otherwise, w(b) 6= i. Let b′i ≥ bi be the lowest signal such that vi(b′i,b−i) ∈ argmaxk vk(b′i,b−i).
There exists such b′i ≤ si since i does not win under bidding profile b but wins under bidding profile
(si,b−i). By the same argument and the continuity of the valuations, there exists j 6= i such that
vj(b
′
i,b−i) ∈ argmaxk vk(b′i,b−i). By Corollary 3.6,
max{γ, c}vw(b)(b′i,b−i) ≥ vj(b′i,b−i) = vi(b′i,b−i) ≥ vi(b∗i ,b−i),
where the last inequality is due to the critical bid definition. Therefore,
ui((si,b−i); s) ≥ vi(s)−max{γ, c}vw(b)(b′i,b−i) ≥ vi(s)−max{γ, c}vw(b)(s),
where the last inequality follows by b ≤ s and the monotonicity of the valuations. This concludes
the proof of (1)
We can now establish the bound on the B-PoA: Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) be a BNE satisfying NOB;
that is, b ≤ s for any b in the support of σ(s). Let Ii(s) be the indicator variable of the event






























= Opt − max{γ, c}Eq(σ),
where (2) holds since the sum of utilities is dominated by the welfare. (3) holds by the equilib-
rium hypothesis (and linearity of expectation). (4) holds by (1). With exact SC (i.e., c = 1), the
bound further improves to γ (see Proposition C.1).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Case 1: NE-PoA is c. Consider the signal spaces S1 = S2 = S3 = [0, 1]
and the following valuations:
v1 = βs1 + 1
v2 = cβs1 + εs2
v3 = cβs1 + εs3
where ε is close to 0.
Let the real signal be s = 1. We claim that bid vector (0, 1, 1) is an equilibrium; agent 1 wins,
and pays either 1 in generalized Vickrey (critical bid payment), and she can not increase her utility
by increasing her bid (her payment is minimal with respect to b−1). The other agents can not
increase their bids by the no overbidding condition, and can not win by decreasing their bids, thus,
both of the agents do not have a beneficial deviation.
In this equilibrium, the achieved welfare is β + 1, but the maximum welfare is cβ + ε. As β can
be arbitrarily large, the NE-PoA is arbitrarily close to c.
Case 2: NE-PoA is γ. Consider the signal spaces S1 = S2 = S3 = [0, 1] and the following
valuations:
v1 = γβs1
v2 = βs1 + s2
v3 = γβs1 + εs3
where ε is close to 0.
Let the real signal be s = 1. We claim that bid vector (0, 1, 1) is an equilibrium; agent 2 wins
and pays ε, and in she can not increase her utility by increasing her bid (her payment is minimal
with respect to b−2). Agent 1 can not win by increasing her bid, because for every bid she send,
agent 3 has a larger value than her, and she can not decrease her bid due to its minimality in
her signal space; moreover, agent 3 can not increase her bid due to its maximality in her signal
space, and can not win the item by decreasing her bid. Thus, both agents do not have a beneficial
deviation.
In this equilibrium, the achieved welfare is β+ 1, but the maximum welfare is γβ+ ε. As β can
be arbitrarily large, the NE-PoA is arbitrarily close to γ.
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4 Multiple Items: A Positive Result
In this section, we study settings with multiple items and unit-demand agents. After some multi-
item preliminaries, we identify a condition limiting knowledge asymmetry among agents, which
can be used to accommodate positive PoA results. We then use it to prove a PoA guarantee for
a simple simultaneous auction in the n ≥ m regime (Theorem 4.7). (For the n  m regime see
Section 5.)
4.1 Multi-item Preliminaries
Participation. Similarly to Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013], we assume agents can communicate to
the item auctions whether or not they wish to participate and compete for the item being sold
(in addition to their signal report). The overall report of agent i is (bi, ai), where bi is the agent’s
vector of reports (bids) of her m signals, and ai is a participation vector with ai` = 1 if the agent
participates in the auction for item ` and ai` = 0 otherwise. The agent’s (mixed) strategy σi(si)
given her vector of signals is then a distribution over possible reports (bi, ai). In Appendix D we
show that if agents are required to participate in all auctions, this leads to a bad PoA.
Notation and Assumptions. Let b (respectively, a) be a profile of n signal reports bi (respec-
tively, ai), and denote by σ(s) a strategy profile given signal profile s, that is, a distribution over
(b,a) pairs. We use Xi(b,a) to denote the item subset allocated in total by the separate auctions
to agent i, given the bid and participation profiles b,a.
In this section, we state our results for valuation profiles satisfying c-SC and γ-heterogeneity.
Standard NOB assumptions for multiple items essentially restrict the sum of every agent’s bids for
items in a subset X to at most the agent’s value for X. We now formalize this notion under IDV:
Definition 4.1 (Multi-item NOB for IDV). With multiple items, a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)









[vi(Xi(b,a); s)] . (5)
Note that this coincides with the standard NOB assumption if valuations are private.
4.2 The Condition of Limited Knowledge Asymmetry
We formulate a condition that enables our positive PoA result. We use the following definition:
Definition 4.2 (Truncated values and welfare). For every agent i and item `, the truncated value
ṽi` given signal profile s is ṽi`(s) = ṽi`(s`) = minj 6=i vi`(s−j`, 0j`). The truncated optimal matching
m̃(s) is a matching in argmaxmatching µ{
∑
(i,`)∈µ ṽi`(s)}, (breaking ties arbitrarily), and the expected





In words, truncated value ṽi`(s) is agent i’s value for item ` after the most significant signal
except for i’s own has been zeroed out; m̃(s) is an allocation that maximizes the social welfare
with respect to the truncated values, given s; and Õpt is the optimal social welfare in expectation
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over s with respect to truncated values. Observe that by the monotonicity of values in signals,
Õpt ≤ Opt.
Given an interdependent setting, the limited knowledge asymmetry condition is the following:
there exists a constant d such that
d · Õpt ≥ Opt. (6)
Intuitively, if a truncated value ṽi`(s) is far from the true value vi`(s), this means that agent i’s
value for item ` is largely determined by the information that is held by a single agent who is not i
herself. This means there is information asymmetry among i and the informed agent. The condition
in (6) rules out settings in which nearly all the welfare stems from such information asymmetry. In
extreme such settings, all information shaping the values can be traced to a single agent – as in the
classic and well-studied “drainage tract” model of Wilson [Wilson, 1969, Milgrom, 2004]. We now
give two opposite examples: a natural setting in which the condition in (6) holds (Example 4.3),
and an extreme setting in which one agent has all the information (Example 4.5). For the second
example we show a lower bound of Ω(m) on the PoA of a natural family of mechanisms.
Example 4.3 (Weighted-sum valuations revisited). Recall the Resale model, introduced in Exam-
ple 1.1. We extend this example to multiple items: Assume for simplicity that n = m. For every
unit-demand agent i and item `, let vi`(s) = si` + β
∑
j 6=i sj` for β ≤ 1 (where the restriction on β
maintains the SC property). We assume all signals are drawn i.i.d. from a monotone hazard rate
(MHR) distribution (such as a uniform, normal, or exponential).
Proposition 4.4. In Example 4.3, for a sufficiently large n, (1 + e)Õpt ≥ Opt.
The proof of Proposition 4.4 appears in Appendix D.
Example 4.5 (Agent 1 holds almost all information). Consider n unit-demand agents with single-
dimensional signals s1, . . . , sn, and signal spaces S1 = [0, 1] for agent 1 and Si = {0} for every agent
i 6= 1. The agents have the following values for every item ` ∈ [n]: Agent 1’s value is v1` = s1, and
for every agent i 6= 1, vi` = (1− ε)s1. Note these valuations are SC and γ-homogeneous.
In Example 4.5, the truncated values are ṽ1` = s1 and ṽi` = 0 for i 6= 1. We get that Õpt = s1
while Opt > n(1− ε)s1, so there is no constant d for which (6) holds.
Proposition 4.6. For each bidder let hi`(s) be a monotone function such that ∀s, hi`(s) ≤ vi`(s),
and hi`(si`,0−i`) = vi`(si`,0−i`). Every mechanism that allocates each item separately to the
highest-valued agent according to hi`(s), and charges an agent zero payment if no-one else par-
ticipates, has EP-PoA of Ω(m) even under NOB. In particular, by hi`(s) = vi`(s) we get that this
holds for simultaneous 2PA or GVA auctions.
The proof of Proposition 4.6 appears in Appendix D and uses Example 4.5. As shown in the
next section, the above proposition holds for the mechanism we develop and use to get good PoA
guarantees. We leave open the question of whether there exists a simple mechanism with good PoA
for settings such as Example 4.5 that do not satisfy (6).
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4.3 Positive Result: n ≥ m Regime
We present a simple simultaneous item-bidding mechanism and show that every BNE of it achieves
an O(max{γ, c}2)-approximation to Õpt. For valuations satisfying Equation (6), it implies an
O(dmax{γ, c}2)-approximation to Opt. In the special case of SC (i.e. where c = 1), the results
suggests that every BNE achieves an O(γ2)-approximation to Õpt and for valuations satisfying
Equation (6), it implies an O(dγ2)-approximation to Opt.
Intuition. Before introducing the mechanism, we provide some intuition that helps shed light
on the choice of our mechanism and its analysis. Specifically, we emphasize how our analysis is
different from the smoothness framework, which has become the standard technique for establishing
PoA results for simple auctions.
A key step in the smoothness paradigm is to find an appropriate hypothetical deviation for each
player such that for any bids of the other bidders, the utility achieved by the deviation is lower
bounded by some fraction of the player’s contribution to the optimal welfare, less some error term.
For the case of independent private values and unit-demand bidders10, Christodoulou et al. [2016b]
show that the hypothetical deviation of going all-in for item ` gives the following guarantee:11
ui((vi`,0i−`),b−i) ≥ vi` −max
j 6=i
bj`, (7)
Inequality (7) suffices to give PoA bounds in full information settings. Moreover, this bound also
applies to settings with incomplete information via an extension theorem, as described next.
Even though the agent does not know the realization of other agents’ valuations, she can sample
from the value distribution of others, and go “all-in” for the item ` she receives in the optimal
allocation in the sampled market, thus effectively simulating the contribution of this agent to the
optimal assignment (the first term in the right-hand side of (7)). This is termed the ‘doppelgänger’
technique. The error term is then bounded by tying it to an allocation for sampled equilibrium
bids and using a NOB assumption.
Unfortunately, there are some major obstacles to generalizing this type of analysis to IDV.
Whereas one can derive a smoothness-type inequality, its right-hand side expression would take
the form of γṽi`(s)−maxj 6=i vj`(bj`, s−j`). Using this inequality, one can derive PoA results for full
information games12, but these bounds would not generalize to incomplete information settings for
the following reasons:
(a) The doppelgänger technique cannot be directly applied. Agent i is only aware of si and is
uninformed of s−i, which affects her valuations. Therefore, sampling signals of other bidders
t−i, and going all-in accordingly, will simulate a different value distribution than the desired
one, as the bid takes into account only si and not s−i.
(b) The error term in Christodoulou et al. [2016b] crucially depends only on the bids of other
bidders, but in IDV the error term depends also on the agents’ real signals, which prevents
from their analysis to go through.
(c) The benchmark in our setting should be the truncated optimal allocation and not the true
optimal allocation.
10For simultaneous second price auctions.
11Bidding her true value vi` for item ` and 0 for all other items.
12We do not include this derivation in the manuscript since it does not help us in proving a bound on the B-PoA.
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The following observation drives our analysis: since the agents have access only to their own
signal, the doppelgänger technique can be successfully applied when considering what we refer to
as privatized valuations; namely, the valuation of agent i under i’s private signal, while zeroing out
the contribution of others’ signals. We can then use the γ-heterogeneous condition to claim that
the effect of other bidders’ signals on the valuation of two different agents is roughly the same.
The discussion above motivates the design of the mechanism we propose, which is a simultaneous
second-price item auction with respect to the privatized valuations (see Fig. 1). For the sake of
analysis, we split the benchmark into two terms. The first term (SELF) accounts for the privatized
valuations, and the second term (OTHER) accounts for the contribution of the signals of other
bidders to the benchmark (see Equation (8)). We proceed by providing smoothness-type inequalities
for each of these terms separately (see Lemma 4.10). Specifically, for each term, we identify an
appropriate hypothetical deviation, such that the expected welfare in equilibrium “covers” it. We
proceed by formalizing the intuition given above.
Privatized values. Given a (reported) signal profile b` for item `, agent j’s privatized value
v̂j` for ` is her value when other agents’ signals are set to zero: v̂j`(b`) = vj`(bj`,0−j`). We use
v̂j`(b`) and vj`(bj`,0−j`) interchangeably. Observe that the privatized value is upper-bounded by
the truncated value v̂j`(b`) ≤ ṽj`(b`). The mechanism analyzed is this section, is essentially a
second price auction on the privatized values of the agent.
Theorem Statement. We focus on the simple mechanism described in Fig. 1, which consists of
simultaneous privatized second-price auctions. This mechanism allocates every item separately by
running a second-price auction over the privatized values of agents participating for this item. Our
main theorem in this section is the following:
Simultaneous privatized second-price auctions
Input: Bid and participation profiles b and a.
Output: An allocation and payments.
For every item ` (simultaneously):
1. For every agent j, compute the privatized value v̂j`(b`) = vj`(bj`,0−j`);
2. Allocate item ` to agent i ∈ argmax{v̂j`(b`) | aj` = 1};
3. Charge agent i a payment pi`(b`,a`) = max{0,max
j 6=i
{v̂j`(b`) | aj` = 1}};
Figure 1: Simultaneous privatized second-price auctions.
Theorem 4.7. Consider a setting with m items, n ≥ m unit-demand agents, and γ-heterogeneous,
c-SC valuations. If d ·Õpt ≥ Opt for some constant d, then the B-PoA of simultaneous privatized
second-price auctions (See Fig. 1) under no-overbidding is O(dmax{γ, c}2).
The condition that d · Õpt ≥ Opt in Theorem 4.7 is necessary, as by hi`(s) = vi`(si`,0−i`),
Proposition 4.6 holds for the simultaneous privatized second-price auction as well. The remainder
of the section is dedicated to proving Theorem 4.7. We use the following notation: Let ui((b,a); s)
denote agent i’s utility under bidding profile (b,a) and signal profile s. Let pi`(b`,a`) be as defined
in Fig. 1.
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We first decompose the welfare as stated above. Recall from Definition 4.2 that m̃(s) is the
matching that maximizes the social welfare with respect to the truncated values at signal profile s.





















In order to prove Theorem 4.7, we show that the equilibrium ‘covers’ the two terms in the
decomposition above. This is shown in Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9, which are proved in Sections 4.3.2 and
4.3.3, respectively.
Lemma 4.8. For every BNE σ, 2Eq(σ) ≥ SELF.
Lemma 4.9. For every BNE σ, O(max{γ, c}2) ·Eq(σ) ≥ OTHER.
With these Lemmas in hand, we prove Theorem 4.7.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Combining Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9 with Equations (8) and (6), for every BNE
σ, we have
(2 + max{γ, c} · (max{γ, c+ 1}+ 2))Eq(σ) ≥ SELF + OTHER = Õpt ≥ Opt/d.
concluding the proof.
We continue by proving Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9, using two deviations which make use of smoothness-
type inequalities (Lemma 4.10), as explained next.
4.3.1 A Smoothness-type Lemma for Interdependence
Recall that in the standard smoothness framework for bounding PoA (with independent private
values), a leading proof technique utilizes the fact that in equilibrium, agent i cannot improve her
utility by going “all-in” for one of the items `. In interdependent settings, agents do not fully know
their own values, so going all-in means the following (under no overbidding): participating only
for item ` (i.e., reporting ai` = 1 and aik = 0 for every item k 6= `), and bidding bi` = si` for this
item (the bids for the other items can be arbitrary). To formulate a smoothness-type argument
in Lemma 4.10 below, we denote by (bi, ai) the all-in report for agent i, and let j` = j`(b,a) be
the agent to whom the privatized second-price auction (Fig. 1) allocates item ` under the bidding
profile (b,a). If the item is not allocated at (b,a) (no agents participate in the item’s auction),
then let j`(b,a) be a dummy agent with a constant value 0 for item `. We now state our lemma:
Lemma 4.10. Consider agent i, bidding profile (b,a), all-in bid (bi, ai) for item `, and true signal
profile s. Then agent i’s utility ui(((bi,b−i), (ai,a−i)); s) from going all-in for ` is at least
(i) v̂i`(s`)− max
j 6=i : aj`=1
{vj`(bj`,0−j`)},
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(ii) ṽi`(s`)−max{γ, c+ 1} · vj``(bj``, s−j``) · Ii 6=j` − vj``(s`) · Ii=j` .
Proof. We begin by showing lower bound (i), and consider two cases:
Case 1: When going all-in agent i is not allocated item ` (and thus is allocated no item). In
this case we have that max
j 6=i : aj`=1
{vj`(bj`,0−j`)} ≥ vi`(si`,0−i`) = v̂i`(s`), and since agent i’s utility
is 0, lower bound (i) holds.
Case 2: When going all-in agent i is allocated item `. So her utility is
vi`(s`)− pi`((bi,b−i), (ai,a−i)) ≥ v̂i`(s`)− max
j 6=i : aj`=1
{vj`(bj`,0−j`)},
and (i) holds.
We now proceed to lower bound (ii). Observe that agent i’s utility from the all-in bid is
nonnegative (i pays at most her value for ` and does not compete for other items). Consider agent
j` = j`(b,a) (the winner of item ` in the privatized second-price auction if agent i reports (bi, ai)
rather than goes all-in). If j` is in fact agent i (so Ii=j` = 1), then her utility from going all-in is
ui(((bi,b−i), (ai,a−i)); s) ≥ 0 = ṽi`(s)− ṽj``(s) ≥ ṽi`(s)− vj``(s).
It remains to show (ii) if j` 6= i. We again consider the two cases from before:
Case 1: When going all-in agent i is not allocated item `. We have that
vj``(bj``,0−j``) ≥ vi`(si`,0−i`).





≥ vi`(bj``, si`,0−{ij`}`)− vi`(si`,0−i`).
Combining the above two inequalities, we get that




≤ (c+ 1)vj``(bj``, si`,0−{ij`}`),
where the last inequality is due to the monotonicity of valuation functions. By applying Corol-
lary 3.6, we get that
max{γ, c+ 1} · vj``(bj``, s−j``) ≥ vi`(bj``, s−j``) ≥ ṽi`(s).
Since we are in the case where i does not get the item, her utility is 0, and (ii) holds.
Case 2: When going all-in agent i is allocated item `. Notice that in this case, v̂j``(b`) =
pi`((bi,b−i), (ai,a−i)) (by definition of pi` and since j` has the highest privatized value). We have
that
ui(((bi,b−i), (ai,a−i)); s) = vi`(s)− pi`((bi,b−i), (ai,a−i))
= vi`(s)− v̂j``(b`)
≥ ṽi`(s)− vj``(bj``, s−j``).
Thus, (ii) holds.
With these inequalities in hand, we now proceed to prove Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9.
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4.3.2 Bounding SELF
Proof of Lemma 4.8. Consider the following deviation from agent i’s equilibrium strategy. Agent i
samples an alternative signal profile t ∼ F, computes a matching mi = m̃(si, t−i), and goes all-in
for the item mii she is matched to in m
i. As in Section 4.3.1, the all-in report is ai` = 1 if ` = m
i
i
and 0 otherwise, and bimii
= simii
.




































In the above, the first inequality holds because the welfare is greater than the utility, the sec-
ond holds because of the equilibrium hypothesis, and the third follows from lower bound (i) in
Lemma 4.10.



























where the first equality is by renaming.














































where the first equality is by renaming and the second is because the term does not use (bi,ai).










































where the first equality is derived from the allocation rule of simultaneous privatized second-price
auctions, and the second inequality follows from the no-overbidding assumption. Combining Equa-
tions (9)-(11) yields the desired bound on SELF.
4.3.3 Bounding OTHER
In this section, we prove Lemma 4.9. For this end, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 4.11. For every two agents i and j, item `, and signal profile s,
max{γ, c} · ṽj`(s) ≥ ṽi`(s)− vi`(si`,0−i`).
Proof. Consider agent j and let k 6= j be some agent such that ṽj`(s) = vj`(0k`, s(−k)`). We consider
two cases:
Case k 6= i: In this case,
ṽj`(s) ≥ vj`(0k`, s−k`)− vj`(si`,0−i`)
≥ (vi`(0k`, s−k`)− vi`(si`,0−i`)) /max{γ, c}
≥ (ṽi`(s)− vi`(si`,0−i`)) /max{γ, c},
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.5, and the third inequality follows from the
definition of truncated valuations.
Case k = i: In this case,
ṽj`(s) ≥ vj`(0i`, s−i`)− vj`(0)
≥ (vi`(0i`, s−i`)− vi`(0)) /max{γ, c}
≥ (vi`(s)− vi`(si`,0−i`)) /max{γ, c}
≥ (ṽi`(s)− vi`(si`,0−i`)) /max{γ, c},
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.5, and the third inequality follows from the
submodularity in others’ signals (Definition 2.2).13
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Consider the following deviation from agent i’s equilibrium strategy, where i
is among the first m agents: Agent i ∈ [m] goes all-in for item i. The all-in report is ai` = 1 if ` = i
and 0 otherwise, and bii = sii.
13This claim is not true without this submodularity assumption, as demonstrated by the function vj`(si, sj , sk) =
vi`(si, sj , sk) = si · sj + si · sk with si = sj = sk = 1. In this case, γ = c = 1, and the LHS of the inequality in the
lemma statement is 0, while the RHS is 1.
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Our goal is to show max{γ, c} · (max{γ, c + 1}+ 2) · Eq(σ) ≥ OTHER. Recall that for item `,
























[ṽii(s)−max{γ, c+ 1} · vjii(bjii, s−jii) · Ii 6=ji − vjii(s) · Ii=ji ] . (12)
In the above, the first inequality holds because the welfare is greater than the utility, the sec-
ond holds because of the equilibrium hypothesis, and the third follows from lower bound (ii) in
Lemma 4.10.

















= OTHER/max{γ, c}, (13)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 4.11.






[max{γ, c+ 1} · vjii(bjii, s−jii) · Ii 6=ji + vjii(s) · Ii=ji ]











































= (max{γ, c+ 1}+ 1)Eq(σ), (14)
where the first inequality is due to the definition of ji(b,a) and the second inequality follows
from the no-overbidding assumption. Combining Equations (12)-(14) yields the desired bound on
OTHER.
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5 Multiple Items: A Negative Result
In this section, we show that for the case of multiple items, there is a separation between the case
of few and many items; namely, when there are much more items then bidders, one cannot hope
for a bound independent of n, even in the very simple case of (a) Common values (which implies
γ = c = 1); (b) Symmetric valuations: the valuation functions describing each of the items are
identical, and each agent/item signal is drawn i.i.d.14; (c) Õpt/Opt −→ 1 as n grows large.




0 w.p. 1− 1/n
,
independently (and identically) of other items. There are n2 items, and the valuation function for
each agent i and item ` is vi`(s) = 1 +
∑
j sj`.
In Theorem 5.1 we establish a gap between the optimal welfare and the welfare in equilibrium
that is a function of n. Before presenting the result, we provide a high-level description of it along
with some intuition.
• Consider an arbitrary set of n items. There are roughly n high signals distributed on items in
this set roughly uniformly. One can use a balls-and-bins type analysis to show that the highest-
valued item in this set has value roughly lnn/ ln lnn, up to constant factors (See Claim 5.2).
Therefore, if one partitions the n2 items arbitrarily into n sets of size n, and assigns the
highest-valued item in each set to a different agent (this assignment can be arbitrary, due to
common value), the obtained welfare is roughly n lnn/ ln lnn.
• Next, we bound the number of items an agent bids on by applying a no-overbidding assump-
tion. Assume an agent bids on a set of items of size k. Since the value of each item is at
least 1, the sum of the agent’s bids is at least k. On the other hand, the value of any set of
items is upper bounded by the value of the grand bundle, which is roughly lnn/ ln lnn (this
is roughly the value of the highest-valued item in the grand bundle, according to a balls-and-
bins type analysis) (see Claim 5.3). Therefore, the no-overbidding assumption implies that
the expected number of items an agent bids on is O(lnn/ ln lnn) (See Equation (18)).
• Finally, since an agent has a very vague idea about the valuable items (she only knows the
+1 her signal may contribute to some of the items), the agent’s bid is basically ‘a shot in
the dark’. Using a balls-and-bins type analysis again, we show that the expected value an
agent derives from the items she bids on is O(ln lnn/ ln ln lnn) (see Claim 5.4), implying that
Eq = O(n ln lnn/ ln ln lnn), which yields a lower bound of Ω̃(lnn).15
The main theorem in this section is the following.
Theorem 5.1. There exists an instance with n unit-demand agents and n2 items, with γ = c = 1,
and Õpt ≈ Opt, where under a no-overbidding assumption, for every item-bidding mechanism and
every equilibrium σ, Opt/Eq(σ) = Ω(lnn ln ln lnn/ ln ln2 n).
Before proving the theorem, we provide some useful claims. We first establish a lower bound
on Opt.
14Moreover, the valuations satisfy the diminishing marginal influence, Definition 2.2.
15Here, Ω̃ hides away terms that are o(lnn).
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Claim 5.2. Opt = Ω(n lnn/ ln lnn).
Proof. We partition the items into n sets of n items. It suffices to show that in each of the sets,
Es[max`∈[n] vi`(s)] = Ω(log n/ log log n), since we can allocate the best items in each set to a different
bidder.
The probability that an item’s value is at least k + 1 is
Pr
s


































Setting k = lnn3 ln lnn , we have k
k ≤ lnn
lnn
3 ln lnn = e
lnn












Let X` be the indicator for the event that item ` has value greater than
lnn
3 ln lnn , and X the number
of such items in a set of n items. We know that



























For each `, Var(X`) ≤ E[X`]2 = 1e2n2/3 , and since X` and Xj are independent for each ` 6= j, we also
have that Cov(X`, Xj) = 0 for each ` 6= j. Therefore, we get Prs
[
max`∈[n]X` ≤ lnn3 ln lnn + 1
]
≤ 1/n,
which implies that Es[max`∈[n] vi`(s)] = Ω(lnn/ ln lnn). This concludes the proof of the claim.
The following claim is used to bound the expected value of the maximal item, and thus the
number of items an agent bids on.






∣∣∣ si] ≤ 4 lnn/ ln lnn+ 3.
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vi`(s) ≥ k + 2





































The first inequality follows because the signals are sampled independently, and the best case is
where si is the all ones vector, and the last inequality is by applying a union bound. We can use
a balls and bins type analysis in order to bound Prs
[∑
j∈[n] sj` ≥ k
]
. Namely, If we consider any





. Using a union




























































 ≤ exp (−3 lnn) = 1
n3
.







































∣∣∣ si] · (n+ 1)










We also bound the expected value an agent might derive by bidding on a set of ln2 n items.
Claim 5.4. If agent i bids on a set of at most ln2 n items, her expected value for that set is at most
4 ln lnn
ln ln lnn + 4 for any realization of si.
Proof. We first bound the probability that the agent sees an item with value greater than 4 ln lnnln ln lnn+2.
Notice that an agent chooses a set of items to bid on without knowing anything about the realization



























where the derivations are similar to the ones in Claim 5.3.






















































































≤ 4 ln lnn
ln ln lnn
+ 2 + 4/ ln lnn+ 2/ lnn+ 1 + 1/n
≤ 4 ln lnn
ln ln lnn
+ 4,
which completes the proof.
With these claims in hand, we are ready to establish the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let Si be the random set of items agent i bids on. We can bound the
expected size of Si for every si by





 ≤ Es−i∼F−i [vi(Si; s)] ≤ 4 lnnln lnn + 3. (18)
The first inequality in (18) follows by the fact that the value is at least 1 for every item and agent,
the second inequality follows by no-overbidding, and the third inequality follows by Claim 5.3.
By Markov inequality, and by Equation (18), we have that for every si,
Pr
[




ln lnn + 3
ln2 n
= O(1/ lnn ln lnn).
We now get that for every si
Es−i,Si [vi(Si; s) | si] ≤ Pr
[
|Si| ≤ ln2 n | si
































where the first inequality follows by Claims 5.3 and 5.4.
27






. Since this is an upper bound on the value of items the agent wins, every agent





in an equilibrium, thus Eq(σ) = O(n ln lnn/ ln ln lnn). Since Opt =
Ω (n lnn/ ln lnn) (by Claim 5.2), we conclude that Opt/Eq = Ω(lnn ln ln lnn/ ln ln2 n).
This concludes the proof Theorem 5.1.
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A Appendix for Section 1
A.1 No Pure Equilibrium Example
Proposition A.1. There exists a single-item, 2-agent setting with c-SC interdependent valuations
such that every auction that allocates the item to the highest-valued bidder, and charges at most
her reported value, admits no pure Nash equilibrium under the no overbidding assumption.
Corollary A.2. There exists a single-item 2-agent setting with c-SC interdependent valuations
such that neither the second-price auction nor the generalized Vickrey auction admit a pure Nash
equilibrium under the no overbidding assumption.
Proof of Proposition A.1. Let M = (x, p) be a single-item auction that allocates the item to the
bidder with the highest reported value, and charges at most the reported value. Consider a 2-bidder
setting, with signal spaces S1 = S2 = [0, 3π] and the following valuations (depicted in Figure 2 as
a function of s1 + s2): v1(s) = sin(s1 + s2) + 2(s1 + s2) and v2(s) = sin(s1 + s2 + π) + 2(s1 + s2).
One can easily verify that these valuations are monotone in both signals, and c-SC for c = 3.
We claim that for the case where the signal profile is s = (2π, 2π), there exists no pure Nash
equilibrium satisfying no overbidding. Falsely assume that there exists b ≤ s such that b is a
pure Nash equilibrium. We show that for every bid bi of the winning agent, the losing agent has a
beneficial deviation. Suppose b is such that agent 1 wins the item. By no overbidding, b1 ≤ s1 = 2π.
We claim that agent 2 has a deviation that grants her strictly positive utility. We first show that
there exists b′2 ≤ s2 = 2π such that agent 2 wins the item. Indeed, there exists k ∈ {1, 2} such that
for b′2 satisfying b1+b
′
2 = 2πk−π/2, it holds that v2(b1, b′2) = 2(2πk−π/2)+1 > 2(2πk−π/2)−1 =
v1(b1, b
′
2). By the allocation rule, agent 2 wins the item. Furthermore, by the assumption on the
payment, p2(b1, b
′
2) ≤ v2(b1, b′2). Therefore, u2((b1, b′2); s) = v2(s)− p2(b1, b′2) ≥ v2(s)− v2(b1, b′2) =
8π − (2(2πk − π/2) + 1) ≥ π − 1 > 0. Thus, agent 2 obtains positive utility.
Analogously, if b is such that bidder 2 wins the item, bidder 1 has a deviation b′1 ≤ s1 that
grants her positive utility (i.e., there exists k ∈ {0, 1} such that for b′1 satisfying b′1+b2 = 2πk+π/2,
bidder 1 has strictly positive utility). This concludes the proof.
Figure 2: Valuations of agents 1 and 2 as functions of s1 + s2. For every bid of one agent, the other
has a winning bid.
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A.2 Appendix for “Challenges” Subsection
Proposition (Formal statement of Proposition 1.2). There exists a single-item, n-bidder
setting, satisfying single-crossing, such that the EP-PoA of every auction that allocates the item
to the highest-valued bidder is Ω(n) (even under no-overbidding).
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Consider a single-item setting with n bidders, signal spaces S1 = {1},




si + ε, v2 = 2(s2 + ε), and ∀i ≥ 3 : vi = si, (19)
where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. Observe that the valuation profile satisfies single-crossing and
submodularity over signals [Eden et al., 2019]. We argue that the bidding strategy profile σ where
σ1(s1) = 1, σ2(s2) = 1 and σi(si) = 0 for every i ≥ 3 is an ex-post equilibrium (EPE): Given the
reported signals we have v1(σ(s)) = 2 + ε, v2(σ(s)) = 2 + 2ε, and vi(σ(s)) = 0 for every i ≥ 3. Thus
bidder 2 wins the item. Bidders 1, 2 cannot deviate since their signal spaces are singletons, and no
bidder i ≥ 3 can ever win by deviating since v1(b′) > vi(b′) for every bid profile b′. If the true
signal profile is s = (1, . . . , 1) then the optimal welfare is n+ ε, while the welfare achieved at EPE
σ is 2 + 2ε, completing the proof.
Proposition (Formal statement of Proposition 1.4). There exists a single-item, n-bidder set-
ting, satisfying single-crossing, such that the EP-PoA of every deterministic ex-post IC-IR mech-
anism is Ω(
√
n) (even under no-overbidding).





si + ε, v2 =
√
ns2, and ∀i ≥ 3 : vi = si, (20)
where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. Observe that the valuation profile satisfies single-crossing and
submodularity over signals [Eden et al., 2019]. We argue that the bidding strategy profile σ where
σ1(s1) = s1, σ2(s2) = s2 and σi(si) = 0 for every i ≥ 3 is an EPE under no-overbidding: No bidder
i ≥ 3 can ever win by deviating since v1(b′) > vi(b′) for every bid profile b′. Bidders i = 1, 2 who
are truthful cannot increase their bids (no overbidding).
A winning bidder cannot gain by decreasing her bid. She either loses the item, in which case,
her utility is 0, while her utility before the deviation is non-negative by no-overbidding and ex-post
IR property; or still wins the item, in which case her payment is the same by the payment rule of
ex-post IC-IR mechanisms, and so is her utility.
A losing bidder cannot win the item by decreasing her bid since the valuation profile satisfies
single-crossing and due to the characterization of ex-post IC-IR mechanisms as monotone. Thus σ
is an EPE as claimed.





n. If all bidders report truthfully, this is an ex-post equilibrium since the mechanism
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is ex-post IC. If the item is allocated to any bidder but 2, then the proposition statement follows.
Assume therefore that given bid profile s1 the mechanism allocates to bidder 2.
Suppose now the true signal profile is s2 = (1, . . . , 1). Since σ is an EPE, if agents bid according




whereas the optimal welfare is v1(s
2) = n+ ε. This concludes the proof.
B Appendix for Section 2
B.1 Appendix for “PoA Background” Subsection
Proof of Observation 2.8. First assume σ is an EPE. By definition, for every i and s′−i, we have




−i)). In particular this holds for s−i. Therefore, σ is a PNE
with respect to s. Now assume that σ is a PNE (not necessarily an EPE). Consider a point-mass
distribution F with probability 1 for signal profile s. Observe that σ is a BNE for this Bayesian
setting.
C Appendix for Section 3 (Single Item)
C.1 Improved PoA Bound for Generalized Vickrey Auction
Proposition C.1 (Improved bound). Consider a single-item setting with γ-heterogeneous, sin-
gle crossing, continuous valuations. The B-PoA of the generalized Vickrey auction under no-
overbidding is at most γ.
In order to prove Proposition C.1, we first establish the following claim.
Claim C.2. Let σ be a BNE of a single-item generalized Vickrey auction with single crossing,
γ-heterogeneous, continuous valuations which satisfies no-overbidding condition. For every s ∼ F
and b ∼ σ(s), let is and ib be some players with the highest values under s and b respectively.
Then γvib(s) ≥ vis(s).
Proof. For some s ∼ F , let b be some bid profile in the support of σ(s). If is = ib the claim is
trivial, thus it is sufficient to consider the case where is is not allocated in b. Assume is is not
allocated in b, hence, uis(b) = 0.
First we show that uis(sis ,b−is) = 0. Assume toward contradiction that this is not the case,
we define a new strategy profile for is
σ′is(ti) =
{
σis(tis) tis 6= sis
sis tis = sis
.
Note that for all signal profile s′ agent’s is bid under the new strategy profile can only increase
with respect to her bid under the old strategy profile, thus if agent is wins under σ(s
′), then
by single-crossing, she remains the winner. Moreover, by the critical payment rule, her payment
remains the same, thus her utility remains the same. If agent is does not win under σ(s
′), then her
utility is 0. When altering her strategy to σ′is , then by no-overbidding, the allocation rule and the
critical payment rule, her utility is non-negative, thus it can not decrease. Moreover, when s′ = s,
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her utility strictly increases. Thus, Es∼F [uis(σ′is(s), σ−is(s))] > Es∼F [uis(σ(s))], in contradiction to
σ being a BNE.
We proceed with our main proof. Consider two cases:
1. is does not win the item under (sis ,b−is). There exists an agent j 6= is s.t. vj(sis ,b−is) ≥
vis(sis ,b−is); ib has the highest value under b, so vib(b) ≥ vj(b) and from Corollary 3.6
we get γvib(sis ,b−is) ≥ vj(sis ,b−is) ≥ vis(sis ,b−is), (ib, j 6= is and bis ≤ sis) by applying
Corollary 3.6 again, we get γvib(s) ≥ vis(s).







is her critical bid. Since the valuation functions are continuous, and




By the same arguments as above, γvib(b
∗
is
,b−is) ≥ vj(b∗is ,b−is) = vis(s). By the monotonicity
of the valuation functions, we get γvib(s) ≥ vis(s).
This concludes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Proposition C.1.
Proof of Proposition C.1. Let σ be a BNE of a generalized Vickrey auction with the above prop-
erties. Denote F the distribution over the signals of the agents; for every signal profile s ∼ F and
bid profile b ∼ σ(s) denote is and ib the agents with the highest values under s and b respectively.
By Claim C.2, γvib(s) ≥ vis(s). It holds that:
Opt = Es∼F [OPT (s)] = Es∼F [vis(s)] = Es∼F [Eb∼σ(s)[vis(s)]]
≤ Es∼F [Eb∼σ(s)[γvib(s)]] = γ Es∼F [Eb∼σ(s)[vib(s)]] (21)
= γ Es∼F [SW(σ, s)] = γEq,
C.2 PoA Bound for Second-Price Auction
We now proceed to prove the same general upper bound from Theorem 3.3 for second-price for
interdependence:
Theorem C.3. Consider a single-item setting with γ-heterogeneous, c-SC valuations. The B-PoA
of the generalized second-price auction for interdependent values under no-overbidding is bounded
by 1 + max{γ, c}.
Proof. Note, the allocation rule of the second-price auction and the generalized Vickrey auction
is the same, and they differ only in the payment rule. Moreover, the only part in the proof of
Theorem 3.3 where we used the payment rule is in case 2, thus, it is suffice to prove case 2 with
the second-price payment rule, and the proof will hold for this Theorem as well.
Case 2: Bidder i wins the item under the bidding profile (si,b−i). Let j ∈ argmaxl 6=i{vl(si,b−i)}.
Bidder i’s utility is ui(s; (si,b−i)) = vi(s)− vj(si,b−i).
Since w(b) wins at b, it is known that vw(b)(b) ≥ vj(b), and by applying Corollary 3.6, we get
max{γ, c}vw(b)(si,b−i) ≥ vj(si,b−i).
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Therefore, ui(s; (si,b−i)) ≥ vi(s) −max{γ, c}vw(b)(si,b−i) ≥ vi(s) −max{γ, c}vw(b)(s), where
the last inequality follows by the no-overbidding assumption and the monotonicity of the valuation
functions.
Thus, the proof of Theorem 3.3 holds. This concludes our proof.
We next show that Theorem C.3 is almost tight.
Theorem C.4. There exist single-item settings satisfying γ-heterogeneity and c-SC such that the
NE-PoA of the second-price for interdependence is arbitrarily close to max{c, γ}, even under no-
overbidding.16
Proof. The same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.4 holds in this setting, the only change
is in case 1, where the payment of agent 1 is ε instead of 1.
D Appendix for Section 4 (Multiple Items: A Positive Result)
D.1 Necessity of Participation Assumption
Proposition D.1. There exists a multi-item, n unit-demand bidders setting, satisfying single cross-
ing and γ-homogeneity, such that the PoA of every auction that allocates each item separately to
the highest valued bidder is Ω(m).
Proof. Consider a setting with n unit-demand agents and signal spaces Si = [0, 1] for every agent
i. For every item ` ∈ [m], let v1` =
∑




2 for every i ≥ 2. Any
auction that allocates each item separately to the highest valued bidder, allocates all items to agent
1, regardless of all bids. Furthermore, bidders 6= 1 are indifferent of their bid, so they might as well
bid their true signal. In this case, the PoA is Ω(m).
Proposition 4.4. In Example 4.3, for a sufficiently large n, (1 + e)Õpt ≥ Opt.
Proof. Given a signal profile s, denote the highest signal for item ` by s(1)`, the second-highest signal
by s(2)` and so on. For every signal profile s, consider a welfare-maximizing matching µ(s); we can
split its total value
∑





The first component is upper-bounded by
∑
(i,`)∈m̃(s) ṽi`(s) (where recall from Definition 4.2 that
m̃(s) is the maximum matching with respect to truncated values), so in expectation over s it is at
most Õpt. It remains to bound the second component,
∑
(i,`)∈µ βmaxj 6=i{sj`}.
To this end, we will look at each item separately. For each item `, it holds that maxj 6=i{sj`} ≤
maxj{sj`}. Consider now a single item setting where each agent’s value is her signal. In this setting,
the above is exactly the maximal social welfare. Moreover, it is well known that when the values
are drawn i.i.d from a MHR distribution, the optimal welfare is within a factor e from the optimal
revenue [Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015, Lemma 3.10]. Moreover, Jin et al. [2019] show that in this





that the revenue from the second price auction is exactly s(2)`.
16The theorem holds even under the additional assumption of Submodularity over Signals, for more information
refer to Eden et al. [2019]
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Combining the above, we get βEs[
∑
(i,`)∈µ






number of agents is at least 2 we get Es[
∑
(i,`)∈µ
βmaxj 6=i{sj`}] ≤ e2βEs[
∑̀
s(2)`].
Observe that for every signal profile s, for every agent i and item `, the truncated value ṽi,`(s) is
at least β
∑
j≥2 s(j)` ≥ β ·s(2)`. So the total value of m̃(s) is at least that of the maximum matching
with respect to edge weights β · s(2)` for all edges adjacent to item `. For such edge weights, every
perfect matching is maximum and has total weight β
∑














{sj`} ≤ Õpt + e2βEs[
∑
`
s(2)`] ≤ (1 + e2)Õpt. (23)




is arbitrarily close to 1, and the approximation is
arbitrarily close to (1 + e).
Proposition 4.6. For each bidder let hi`(s) be a monotone function such that ∀s, hi`(s) ≤ vi`(s),
and hi`(si`,0−i`) = vi`(si`,0−i`). Every mechanism that allocates each item separately to the
highest-valued agent according to hi`(s), and charges an agent zero payment if no-one else par-
ticipates, has EP-PoA of Ω(m) even under NOB. In particular, by hi`(s) = vi`(s) we get that this
holds for simultaneous 2PA or GVA auctions.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Consider the setting depicted in Example 4.5, where F1 = U [0, 1], and
the following strategy profile (b,a): b1`(s1) =
1
ms1 for every `, a1(s1) = (1, . . . , 1), and bi`(si) = 0
for every `, ai(si) = (0, . . . , 0) for every i ≥ 2. That is, agent 1 is the only participant for every
item.
We argue that (b,a) is an ex-post equilibrium. First, note that the distribution of the signal
of bidder 1 is continuous, thus there is no point mass at 0. This implies s1 > 0 with probability
1, and by bidder 1 strategy, b1 > 0. Furthermore, the signal spaces of agents i ≥ 2 are singletons,
meaning they cannot bid differently than 0. Keeping this in mind, for every item `, the value of
bidder 1, as it seen by the mechanism, dominates the values of all other bidders (for every b′ where
b′1 > 0; h1`(b
′) ≥ h1`(b′1,0−1) = v1`(b′1,0−1) = v1`(b′) > vi`(b′) ≥ hi`(b′)). And by the allocation
rule, if bidder 1 participates in the auction for an item, no other agent can win by participating.
This follows that for every agent i ≥ 2 there is no improving deviation.
As for agent 1, she is the only participant for every item, and by the payment rule, she pays 0
for each item. Moreover, she wins all the items, thus, her utility is maximized.
Finally, SW(b,a) = s1 while Opt ≥ m(1− ε)s1. This concludes the proof.
E Randomized Mechanisms
This paper focuses on simple deterministic mechanisms. One may hope to get better bounds with
respect to the broader (yet more complex) family of random mechanisms. This section shed some
light on this topic.
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Proposition E.1 addresses the random-sampling Vickrey auction of Eden et al. [2019] – an ex-
post IC-IR mechanism that randomly partitions the bidders into two sets A,B. The mechanism
then allocates the item to the bidder in set B with highest “zeroed-out” value, where the zeroed-out
value of bidder i ∈ B is vi(sA, si,0B\{i}). Besides its simplicity, the big advantage of the random-
sampling Vickrey auction over other auction formats in the context of interdependent values is that
it achieves good welfare guarantees even with no SC assumption, as long as the SoS properties hold.
To our knowledge this is the only known such mechanism to date. Unfortunately these guarantees
no longer hold when we consider all equilibria and not just the truth-telling one. In fact it no longer
holds even when we consider only no-overbidding equilibria, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition E.1. There exists a single-item n-agent setting with SoS, interdependent valuations
(that do not satisfy SC), where the EP-PoA of the random-sampling Vickrey auction is Ω(2n), even
under no-overbidding.
Proof. Consider a single-item setting with n bidders, signal spaces Si = [0, 1] for every i, and the
following valuation profile:
v1 = s1 + c
n∑
i=2
si, and ∀i ≥ 2 : vi = si + 2i, (24)
where c is a sufficiently large scalar to be determined below. Observe that the valuation profile
satisfies SoS. We argue that the bidding strategy profile b where b1(s1) = s1 and for every i ≥ 2,
bi(si) = 0 is an ex-post equilibrium. For every bid profile b
′ and every random partition A,B of
the bidders chosen by the random-sampling Vickrey auction, bidder i ≥ 2 never wins if B contains
a higher-indexed bidder, by the following chain of inequalities:
∀i, j ∈ B, 2 ≤ i < j : vi(b′A, b′i,0B−i) = b′i+ 2i ≤ 1 + 2i < 2(i+ 1) ≤ 2j ≤ b′j + 2j = vj(b′A, b′j ,0B−j).
At bidding strategy profile b−1, for every report b
′
1 and every partition A,B, bidder 1 wins if and
only if she is the only bidder in B. Indeed, assuming bidder 1 ∈ B:
∀i ∈ B, i ≥ 2 : v1(0A, b′1,0B−1) = s1 < 2i ≤ vi(0A,0B).
Thus, whether bidder 1 wins or not does not depend on her bid. We conclude that under b, the
item is allocated to the highest-indexed bidder in set B, and no losing bidder can become a winner
by deviating. Furthermore, in an ex-post IC-IR mechanism, the winner’s payment according to
the known characterization does not depend on her bid (see Section 1.1). It follows that b is an
ex-post equilibrium. Also, b clearly satisfies no-overbidding with respect to any true signal profile.
Suppose now the true signal profile is s = (1, . . . , 1). The probability under b that bidder 1
wins the item is the probability of choosing exactly bidder 1 among all n bidders to be in set B,
i.e., 12n . Observe also that among all bidders i ≥ 2, bidder n has the highest value. The expected




2n (1 + c(n − 1)) + (1 −
1
2n )(2n + 1),
whereas the optimal welfare obtained from always allocating the item to bidder 1 is 1 + c(n − 1).
For a sufficiently large c, say c ≥ 2 · 2n, we get EP-PoA = Ω(2n), completing the proof.
In Proposition E.1 we established a lower bound for a simple randomized auction that satisfies
ex-post IC-IR. The next result (Proposition E.2) shows we cannot expect a general lower bound
to hold for all randomized ex-post IC-IR auctions (in contrast to deterministic such mechanisms –
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recall Proposition 1.4). Yet, our results might suggest that in order to obtain good PoA guarantees
one must resort to fairly unnatural mechanisms like the one constructed in the next proposition.
A randomized mechanism is called universally ex-post IC-IR if it is a distribution over determin-
istic ex-post IC-IR mechanisms. Informally, Proposition E.2 shows that under the no-overbidding
assumption, every α-approximation universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism can be transformed into
a randomized mechanism with NE-PoA at most α1−ε , for arbitrarily small ε. Since there exist
universally ex-post IC-IR mechanisms with constant-approximation welfare guarantees for SoS val-
uations (such as in Eden et al. [2019]), Proposition E.2 rules out a lower bound on the randomized
mechanism’s EP-PoA. The proposition makes use of a proportional allocation mechanism defined
as follows: given bid profile b, the item is allocated to bidder i with probability bi∑
j bj+1
.
Proposition E.2. Let M be an α-approximation welfare maximizing, universally ex-post IC-IR
mechanism. For every ε > 0, the randomized mechanism M′ which runs M with probability 1− ε
and runs the proportional allocation mechanism with probability ε has NE-PoA ≤ α1−ε under no-
overbidding.
Before proving Proposition E.2, we prove the following claim.
Claim E.3. If a mechanism M is universally ex-post IC-IR and satisfies the no-overbidding as-
sumption, then M is DSIC.
Proof. Since every universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism is a probability distribution over deter-
ministic ex-post IC-IR mechanisms, it is sufficient to prove the lemma for deterministic M. Let
M = (x, p) be a deterministic ex-post IC-IR mechanism. Recall that x is monotone and the pay-
ment rule p is unique, and consist with the critical payment rule which determined only by the bids
of the competing bidders (for more detail, see the characterization of ex-post IC-IR mechanisms in
Section 1.1). Let b be a bid profile. For every bidder i, denote pi(b−i) her payment according to
b.
Consider two cases:
1. i wins under b, i.e., xi(b) = 1. By monotonicity and no-overbidding, xi(si,b−i) = 1. It holds
that ui((si,b−i); s) = vi(s)− pi(~b−i) = ui((bi,b−i); s).
2. i loses under b, i.e., xi(b) = 0. If xi(si,b−i) = 0, then ui((si,b−i); s) = 0 = ui(b; s). Thus, it
suffices to consider the scenario where xi(si,b−i) = 1. By the monotonicity of x, the critical
payment rule and by the monotonicity of the valuations we get vi(si,b−i) ≥ vi(b∗i ,b−i) =
pi(si,b−i). Therefore ,ui((si,b−i); s) = vi(si,b−i)− vi(b∗i ,b−i) ≥ 0 = ui(b; s).
In both cases, ui((si,b−i); s) ≥ ui(b; s).
Proof of Proposition E.2. LetM be a universally ex-post IC-IR mechanism. By Claim E.3,M, un-
der no-overbidding, is in fact DSIC. We show that inM′, truth-telling is the unique no-overbidding
PNE. For every bidder i, signal profile s and bid profile b−i, bidding bi = si is a best response
under no-overbidding, whereas any bid bi < si is not a best response:
uM
′
i ((bi,b−i); s) = (1− ε)uMi ((bi,b−i); s) + ε
bi∑
j bj + 1
vi(s)
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≤ (1− ε)uMi ((si,b−i); s) + ε
bi∑
j bj + 1
vi(s) (25)
< (1− ε)uMi ((si,b−i); s) + ε
si∑




where Inequality (25) follows M is DSIC. The truth-telling PNE yields at least (1 − ε)/α of the
optimal welfare, and so NE-PoA ≤ α1−ε .
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